Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/54

40 FEDERAL REPORTER. �the public, It would afCord no protection to either a^^ainst the sale of a spuri- ous in place of the genuine article. ihis object ol' the trade-mark, and the consequent limitations upon its use, are stated with great clearness in the jase of Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 1. iliere the court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Strong, that no one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or trade-name which would practically give hira a mo- nopoiy in the sale of any gooda other than, those produced or made hy Jiimself. If he could, the public would be injured rather than protected, for competition M'ould be destroyed. Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a tradft-mark, and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection." �In the case of Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 322, it is stated that the— �"Office of a trade-mark is to point. out distinctively the origin or ownership of the article to which it is afflxed; or, in other words, to give notice who was the producer." " �And that there are some limita to the right bf selection will be manifest. It is further said, in that case : �" When it is considered that in all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another; and that it is only when this false representation is directly or in- directly made that the party who appeals to a court of equity can have relief. This is the doctrine of all the authorities." �"And it is obvions that the same reasons," continues the opinion in that case, " which forbid the exclusive appropriation of generic names, or of those merely descriptive of the article manufactured, and which can he employed with truth hy other manufacturer s, apply with equal force to the appropriation of geographical names designating districts of country. Their nature is such that they cannot point to the origin (personal origin) or ownersliip of the article of trade to which they may be applied. They point only at the place of prodxiction, not to the producer, and could they be appropriated exclusively the appropriation would resuit in mischievous monopolies." �In the same opinion, Mr. Justice Strong quoted, with approval, an extract from the opinion in the case of the Amoskeag Manuf'g. Go. y. Spear, 2 Sandford, Sup. Ct. 509, as follows: �" The owner of an original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be pro- tected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms, or symbols that were appropriated as designating the time, origin, or ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right to the exclusive use of any words, letters, figures, or symbols which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to indicate their names or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or a syimbol, which, from the nature of the fant it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth, and there- fore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose." ��� �