Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/56

42 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Novv, if I adopted the distinction drawn by the master of the rolls between local and Personal trade-marks, I should be more inclined to treat this mark as inci- dent to the possession of the Bloomfleld' Iront Works, for it has been used by successive owners of such works, and seems to have been used by the last partnership in no other right. In this respect the case resemhles that of Motley V. Downman, 3 Myl. & Cv. 1. �" But it is unnecessary to pursue this further, for I am of opinion that these initial letters, surmounted by a crown, have become, and are, a trade-mark, properly so called — that is, a brand which has reputation and currency in the market, as a well-known sign or quality; and that as such the trade-mark ia a valuable property of the partnership, as an addition to the Bloomfleld "Works, and may be properly sold with the works,. and therefore properly included as a distinct subject of value in the valuation to the surviving part- ners. �" It must be recollected that the question before me is simply whether the right to use the trade-mark can be sold along with the business and iron works, so as to deprive the surviving partner of any right to use the mark in case he should set up a similar business. . Nothing that I have said is intended to lead to the conclusion that the business and iron works might be put up for sale by the court in one lot, and that the right to use the trade-mark might be put up as a separate lot, and that one lot might be sold and transferred to one person, and the other lot sold and transferred to another; the case requir- ing only that I should decide that the exclusive right to this trade-mark belongs to the partnership as part of its property, and might be sold with the business and work and as a valuable right, and if it might be so sold, it must be included in the valuation to the surviving partner." �It will be observed with tvhat pains the lord chancelier guards against the conclusion that, even in such a case, the title to the trade-mark could be separated fronj that of the establishment upon the produet of which it had always been used, even when the trade- mark was not the mere name of the place of manufacture, but a trade-mark proper, denoting the personal origia of the manufac- tured article. .■•.■■■ �The case of Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 617, is to the like effect. The trade-mark in that case — "S. N. Pike's Magnolia Whisky, Cin- cinnati, Ohio" — was a trade-mark proper; that is, indicated the per- sonal origin of the manufacture, $,nd was not the mere name of the place of manufacture. Pike sold his establishment to be carried on for the same business by his suceessors, and with it the right to use his brands. The court said, in deciding the case, (p. 620:) �"As to the right of Pike to dispose of his trade-mark in connection with the establishment where the liquor was 'manu'factured, we do not think there can be any reasonable doubt. �"It is true, theprimary object of a trade-mark is to indicate by its raean- ing or association the brigiii of the article to wlitch it is affixed. As dis- ��� �