Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/583

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UNITED STATES V. GRISWOLD. 569 �him. But be this as it may, the conveyance to J. M. A., as between the parties, was only intended as a security for the money advanced or indebtedness discharged, and the property was to be held by thc grantee in trust for Griswold. And whatever amount was paid in the process of substituting C. A. as crediter and trustee in place of J- M. A., and for the final conveyance to J. 0. G., there can be no doubt but that the husband gave the direction and furnished the money, and there- fore the wife now holds the property in trust for him. �The question of whether the conveyances to J. M. A., C. A,, and J. 0. G. were made with a fraudaient intent "is one of fact and not of law." Or. Laws, § 54. There can be no doubt that such was the intention so far as the existing creditors were concerned, but there is nothing to show that they were made with such specifie intention so far as the plaintifif is concerned, while the reasonable inference is that the final conveyance to the wife was procured by the husband with the intent to put the property beyond the reach of his creditors, existing or subsequent. �But the conveyance to the wife by C. A. being made upon a con- sideration moving from the husband, she took the property in trust for him, and a court of equity will disregard such device, and subject it to the claims of the husband's creditors arising at any time during the existence of the trust or continuance of the device as fully as though it stood in his own name. Doyle v. Sleeper, 1. Dana, 536. �In this view of the matter the only remaining inquiry is, was the conveyance to the wife intended at the time by Griswold as a gift to or post-nuptial settlement on her, or was it merely a convenient de- vice for putting the property where he might enjoy the benefit of it without the risk of admitted ownership — the liability of its being taken to satisfy his creditors, existing or subsequent ? �At the date of the conveyance, Griswold having been discharged from his debts incurred prier to his bankruptcy, and none others ap- pearing to have been then contracted, the conveyance to her of the property as an actual gift or settlement would be valid as against his subsequent creditors — such as the plaintiff. And in the absence of anything to the contrary, in a case free from suspicion, the propei inference would be that the wife took the property absolutely for her- self, aecording to the terms of the conveyance. Dick v. Hamilton, 1 Deady 329. �But it is not elaimed, on the part of the defendants, that the con- sideration for this conveyance was a present gift to the wife, but only ��� �