Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/671

WOOLBIDGE V. m'kENNA. 657 �general or special. But even in that class of cases we are not exercising a special jurisdiotion because of the removal, but because it was special in the state court and must be so here, and for the same reason. It is true no process issues from this court, but it does from the state court; and where the case cornes within the influence of the constitution and laws of the United States and is removable here, the parties to the process understand that they are summoned not only to the state court, but, if the adversary party or they choose, to the federal court as well, to settle their controversy. Moynahan v. Wilson, 6 Cent. L. J. 28; McLeod v. Dimcan, 5 McL. 343. �The jurisdiction la conferred by the constitution, and is plenary and exhaustive. Thisact of oongress bas vitalized the constitutional grant and regulated the jurisdiotion. The second section fiefines the jurisdiction in removal causes, prescribes the class of cases to which we are authorized to apply it, and in itself contains no condition pre- cedent or subsequent upon which its exercise depends. The third and seventh sections, relating to the matter in contention here, are purely practice regulations by which a method of procedure is pre- scribed, and are not at all jurisdictional. This may be said, it seems to me, of all the sections to this act, except the first and second, and that clause of the seventh which punishes the clerk of the state court for refusing a copy of the record, and confers jurisdiction of the offence. The framework of the statute indicates a purpose to define the whole civil jurisdiction of the court in the first two sections, and to regulate the practice in removal cases in the others; and to this were (perhaps subsequently) added in the eighth and ninth sections independant regulations applicable to all cases, whether originally brought here or removed. This is shown by the title to the act, which is instructive on this point. The whole statute must be looked to in construing any part, unquestionably ; but then this obvions separation of subjects is equally as important and available as an indication of the intention we are seeking. Act March 3, 1875, (18 St. 470.) �We are, then, in the construction of this statute, authorized to treat it, not as one conferring extraordinary jurisdiction or prescribing extraordinary processes and methods of procedure, (except, perhaps, the eighth section, regulating substituted process,) but as one grant- ing ordinary jurisdiction and regulating the practice applicable to it. There is, as the books disclose, a vast difference between the two kinds of statutes in the rules of construction to be applied, the one being strict and the other liberal v.8,no.9— 42 ��� �