Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/787

SHELDON V. KEOKOK NORTHERN LINE PACKET CO. 773 �To the same effect speaks the supreme court of Wisconsin in Hamlin v. Wright, 23 Wis. 494, where it is said that — �" ihe fact that all the grantees have become accessory to the fraudaient at- tempt of the debtor to place his property beyond his creditor's reach, gives them such a eommon connection with the subject-matter of the suit that they may be joined, although the purchase of each was distinct from the others, and each is chargea with participating in the fraud in respect to his own pur- chase. * * * There was, therefore, no misjoinder of causes of action in uniting the different fraudulent defendants, although they purchased at different times, and each is charged only with fraud in his own purchase." �See, also, Story, Eq. PI. (9th Ed.) §§ 271-280, § 530-540 ; Adams, Bq. (6th Am. Ed. by Sharswood,) 617, note 2; Blake v. Van TU- horg, 21 Wis. 680; Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 673. �As to the second point raised by the demurrer, that complainants, independent of any statute of limitations, have lost their right tp relief by delay in Buing, I do not think it well taken. The authori- ties cited under this head by counsel for defendants apply to suits not strictly within any statute of limitations. The legislature here bas declared that actions for relief on the ground of fraud, in cases heretofore solely cognizable by the court of chancery, "may be com- menced wiihin six years after the discovery of- the faets constituting the fraud." Administering the law in this suit, I do not think relief should be denied even if it appeared that the complainants might have applied for relief at an earlier date, when the frauds complained of were first discovered. The court should not assume or infer unreasonable delay, after such discovery^ from the isolated fact that the fraud oharged was committed several years before the commencement of the suit. It is consistent with the bill that the fraud, and the facts constituting the fraud, were not discovered until some time after they were committed. If the doctrine of laches or lapse of time can ever be asked in a suit as to which there is a statute of limita- tions prescribing the period within which such suit may be eommenced, a demurrer, insisting upon lapse of time short of the statutory period, should not be sustained, unless the bill upon its face, without re- Borting to inferences, makes a clear case of unreasonable delay, upon the parts of the complainants, after the diecovery of the fraud charged. �This brings me to the question of the statute of limitations. In considering this question I have carefully examined the several revisions of the statute of Wisconsin as well as those of New York, to ■which counsel refers. I have also read the decisions of the New York ��� �