Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/807

GKBENWALT V. TOOKEB. 793 �Mrs. Musser having failed to pay them, the land was sold hy sald Conn, In pursuance of the terms of said deed, to Gibson, and a deed to him waa executed by said trustee, May 3, 1875. Gibson immediately went into possession, and he and his grantees have since held the premises. Defendants claim through mesne conveyances under said deed of trust and the deed to Gibson, and con- tend that said tax deeds only conveyed the iuterest of Mrs. Musser, and did not aftect their title. �Menk e Menk, for plaintiff . �R. Schvlenherg and Charles Gibson, for Sefenclants. �McCbaby, C. J. This is an action for ejectment brought by plain- tifi, claiming under a tax title, to reoover certain real estate situated in the city of St. Louis. The laws under which the sales and trans- fer were made are very confused, inasmuch as from the General Stat- utes there are repeated exceptions as to St. Louis county. It appears, however, with sufficient definiteness, that under the acts of 3 872 and 1873, even when analyzed in connection with the act of 1874, that every person "owning or holding property shall be liable for the taxes thereon." See Laws of Missouri, 1873, § 59, p. 95. The agreed case and deeds submitted therewith show that Gibson sold the lots in ques- tion to Mrs. Musser and conveyed the same to her by deed, which was properly recorded. It also appeared that at the time of this sale Mrs. Musser entered into possession and remained in possession untU after the taxes in controversy were assessed and levied upon the property. At the time of the sale by Gibson to Mrs. Musser he took from her a deed of trust to one Conn, as trustee, to secure the payment of the unpaid portion of the purchase mony and of acoruing taxes, etc., with the usual terms of forfeiture. �We are inclined to the opinion that the tax laws in force at the time in the county of St. Louis required the assessment to be made, not numerically, but alphabetically, in the name of the person "own- ing or holding" the property. Mrs. Musser, by the terms of the con- veyance to her, was the owner and holder of the property for the pur- pose of taxation, subject to defeasance. Hence, the assessment was rightfully in her name. She did not cease to be the owner — certainly she did not cease to be the holder — of the real estate by reason of having executed the deed of trust to recover the unpaid purchase money due to Gibson. �The acts of the special assembly applicable to this case were de- signed to enforce the collection of taxes through the different means provided, and, in the absence of their payment, they authorized pro- cceedings against the realty itself, which stood charged with the lien therefor, to be enforced through the colleotor. This property was so ��� �