Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/864

850 FEBEBAL BEPOBTEB. �William I. Carpenier and Alfred Russell, for complainants. �F. H. Canfield and Q. Y. N. Lothrop, for defendants. �Beown, D. J. It is a well-established principle of law that where a right of action is given by a state statute such right may be enforced in another state, and also that such right will be enforced according to the forms and modes of procedure in use in the latter state. Or, to put it briefly, the lex loci contractus governs the rights of parties, but the lex fori determines the remedy. This principle bas been applied in a large numberof cases arising upon contracts, but in the recent case of Dennick v. Railroad Co. 103 U. S. 11, it was applied to a statute of this description, where the administrator brought bis action in another state. An almost unbroken series of adjudications bas also establiahed the further proposition that the time -within which an action may be brought relates generally to the remedy, and must be determined by the law of the forum. Hence, it would follow that if this statute contained no limitation of time within which an action must be brought, and the time had been left to depend upon the general statutes of limitations in the province of Ontario, it is clear that we should have disregarded such statute, and permitted the plaintifif to bring this action at any time before actions of this description would be barred by the statutes of this state. �An exception to this general rule, however, is suggested by Mr. Jus- tice Story, in bis Conflict of Laws, § 582, of cases where the statutes of limitation or prescription of a particular country do not only ex- tinguiah the right of action, but the claim or title itself, ipso facto, and declare it a nullity after the lapse of the presoribed period ; and the parties are within the jurisdiction during the whole of that period, so that it bas actually and fully operated upon the case. �" Suppose, for instance, personal property la adveraely held in a state for a period beyond that preacribed by the laws of that state, and, after that period has elapsed, the possessor should remove into another state, which has a longer period of prescription, or is without any prescription, could the orig- inal owner assert a title there against the possessor, whose title, by the local law and the lapse of time, had become final and conclusive before the re- moval." �The cases of Shelhy y, Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 ; Goodman y. Munks, 8 Port. 84, (overruled by Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. 248;) Brown v. Brown, 6 Ala. 608; and Fears v. Sykes, 35 Miss. 633, do, in fact, lend sup- port to this distinction ; the general tenor of these cases being to the eiiect that where the statute of oiie state declares that the possession of Personal property for a certain period vests an absolute title, such ��� �