On the eighteenth of July, 1870, Ann Orr Rankin, a subject and resident of Great Britain, who had never resided in the United States, died, testate, in Ireland. At the date pf her death she owned real estate and personal estate both in Ireland and the United States. The latter property, situate in St. Louis, had been long held and managed by her agent in said city.
By her will she left to her mother and sister, in equal shares, all the income of her estate during the natural life of the mother, and, at the death of the mother, one-half to go to her brother Robert, and the other half to be divided in seven parts, distributable as in the will stated. The will named her three brothers executors. Said will was probated in Ireland, where twenty-four twenty-eighths of said estate, situate in that country, were distributed. On November 2, 1870, said will was probated in St. Louis and letters testamentary granted, and such proceedings had thereunder that the defendant became sole executor in charge of the estate. On October 13, 1877, the life-tenants conveyed their interest to the remainder-men. From the death of the testatrix (1870) to the date of said conveyance (1877) said executor paid to said mother and sister in Ireland, as income derived from the personal property in St. Louis, the sum of $30,218.93, which sum was the value of said estate in the hands of the executor. All of the remainder-men who purchased the life estate aforesaid, except two, were citizens and residents of Great Britain, and one of the two, Robert, conveyed his interest (when is not alleged) to a brother and sister, not citizens or residents of the United States. In due course of administration the St. Louis probate court ordered final distribution of the legacies, and, in accordance with the foregoing rights, to be paid by this defendant as executor. The petition sets out in detail what sums the executor, pursuant to said order, paid to the respective parties, etc. Although the date of said order and of said payment is not stated, yet it is understood it was subsequent to 1877.
A demurrer to the petition is interposed, and has been fully argued.
Bliss, Drummond & Smith, for the United States.
G. M. Stewart, for defendant.
Treat, D. J. On the foregoing statement of facts several intricate propositions arise, under the revenue laws of the United States, concerning some of which decisions have been made apparently in conflict with each other.
Prior to the repealing act of July 14, 1870, the several United States statutes, concerning succession and legacy taxes, provided that executors, etc., as to legacies or distributive shares from personal property, should be made subject to the duty or tax prescribed, when said property passed—
"From any person possessed of such property, either by will or by the intestate laws of any state or territory, or any personal property or interest therein, transferred by deed, etc., made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor or bargainer," etc.
The first contention is as to the terms of the statute concerning
