Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/941

THE ANN. 9^37 �oyster law of 1833 as not being repugnant to the povrer of congress to regulate commerce, proceeds to say, (p. 76 :) �"And it is the judgment of this court that it is within the legislative power of the State to intercept the voyage, and inflict the forfeiture of a vessel, for disobedience, by those on board, of the commands of such a law. To inflict a forfeiture of a vessel on account of the misconduct of those on board — treat- ing the thing as liable to forfeiture because the instrument of the ofience-^is within the established principles of legislation which have been applied by most civilized governments." �In the same case the supreme court also held that the law of 1833 . ■was not repugnant to the provisions of the federal constitution which confera all admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States. �, It is true that there was no notice, by service or publication of notice, to the owner or hoiders of maritime or other liens, that the vessel was being proceeded against ; but a proeeeding in rem forms an exception to the general rule of notice, particularly when based upon aotual manucaption of the thing which is the instrument of the wrong, and in such cases the seizure bas been held to be constructive notice to every one having any interest in the thing seized. �The supreme court, in The Mary, 9 Cranch, 14e, bas said : �«'The whole workl, it is said, are parties in an admiralty cause, and there- fore the whole world is bound by the decision. The reason of the dicttim wlll determine its extent. Every person may make himself a party, and appeal from the sentence. * * * Where proceedings are against the person, notice is served personally or by publication ; where they are in rem, notice is served on the thing itself. This is necessarily notice to all those who have any interest in the thing, and is reasonable because it is necessary, and because it is the part of common prudence for all those who have any interest in the thiug to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it." �But it is also a just qualification of the foregoing rule that, unless the party to be affected with the actual or constructive notice would, if he had appeared, have been allowed to assert his right, and be heard in its defence, the proeeeding cannot affect him. The Mary, supra; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 277; Bradstreet v. Ins. Go. 3 Sumn. 607; The Henrietta, 1 Newb. 292. �In the present case, with regard to the owner of the schooner, the act of 1880 provided that she might have a right of appeal from the decree of forfeiture, and she was thereby given a right to be heard. With regard, however, to any other persons having maritime liens or interest in the vessel, I cannot see that the law made it possible for them in any way to intervene and defend their rights. It is not ��� �