Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/50

m BB k'kes'sa.. ■ S§ �either that he holda jure uxoris, or the larger estate of tenancy by the curtesy. �It is always a question of intention whether the legislature bas, by such statutes as these, eut off the husband's marital rights en- tirely or only partially; and they are construed, just as wills, deeds, marriage settlements, and other conveyances are, to go no further in that direction than the language used, in terms or by uecessary implication, reqnires. This construction I have given the statute is supported by every Tennessee case which bas construed or mentioned it. Johnson v. Shaiy, i Cold. 45 ; Dodd v. Bentiial, e Heisk. 601 ; Bottoms V. Corley, 5 Heisk. 1; Corley v. Corley, 8 Bas. 7; McCallum Y. Petigrew, 10 Heisk. 394; Lmeas v. Bickerich, 1 Lea. 120; Yuung V. Lea, 3 Sneed, 249; Coleman v. Satterficld, 2 Head. 259; Oillespie V. Worfœ-d, 2 Cold. 682; Aiken v. Suttle, 4 Lea. 103. �It is also supported by the cases construing settlements on the wife by will or deed, where the benefits conferred, the language used, and the restrictions on alienation and the husband's marital rights are similar to those in this statute. Brown v. Brown, 6 Humph. 126 ; HamricQ v. Laird, 10 Yerg. 222; Frazier v. Hightower, 12 Heisk. 94; Baker v. Heiskell, 1 Cold. 641; Appleton v. Rowley, L. E. 8 Eq. 139; Marshall v. Beall, 6 How. 70; Moore v. Webster, L. E. 3 Bq. 267; Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 816; Eden, Bankruptcy, 245; 25 Law Lib. 193. �It also finds a complete analogy in the construction of lour home- stead statutes, which confer a similar benefit on the husband, wife, and children, and yet it is beld that creditors may subject the hus- band's interest, subject to this right of occupanoy and possession by the f amily, which may last during the life of the husband and wife or the survivor, and until the youngest child reaches a certain age. Moore v. Hervey, 1 Leg. Eep. (Tenu.) 22; Mash v. Rmsell, 1 Lea. 548; Lninsford v. Jarrett, 2 Lea. 579; Gilbert v. Cowan, 3 Lea. 203; Gray v. Baird, 4 Lea. 212; Jarman v. Jarman, Id. 671, 676. , La, Marsh v. Russell, supra, it is said, "the vendee is clothed with the legal title in reversion expectant on the termination of the home- stead estate," which quite as accurately describes the kind of estate the assignee took in this case. �The same ruling has been made in other states where the statutes give a qualified homestead exemption, while in those where the exemption is absolutely of the whole estate, the assignee takes noth- ing. Rix V. Capitol Bank, 2 Dill. 367; Re Tertellmg, Id. 339; Re Betts, 15 N. B. Ej 537; Johmon v. May, 16 N. B. E. 4.25; Me Wah ��� �