Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/646

KEEP V. IND1ANAP0LI8 & ST. LOUIS R. CO. 631 �HnclR.Co. 4 Hurl. & IT. 614; S. C. 28 L. J. (Exch.) 885; Najac v. Boston, etc., R.Co. 7 Allen, 329; Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Oopeland,2i 111. 337; Wilson V. Chesapeake R. Co. 21 Gratt. 654; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; S. 0. 29 Barb. 401; Ilart v. Rensselaer, etc., R. Co. 8 N. Y. 37; Burnell v.New. York, et&, R Co. 45 N. Y. 184; Weed v, Saratoga, etc., R. Co. 19 Wend. 534; Candee v. Pa. R. Co. 21 Wis. 582 ; S. 0. Thomp. Carriers of Pass. 419 ; Cai-ter v. Peek, 4 Sneed, 203. It bas been supposed, however, that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the real nature of the contract, whether the flrst carrier did, in fact, assume to carry the passenger for the entire distance called for by the ticket or tickets. This proceeds upon the idea that the ticket is not a contract, but a mere token, and that its meaning may well be explained by pai-ol, Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N, Y. 306. A similar view obtains in Tennessee, Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. 8prayherry, 9 Heisk. 852 ; S. C. 1 Cent. Law J. 541. But this view is questionable. It is no doubt true as a fact that nearly all the American railways have running connections with each other, 80 that one railway company will issue tickets at any principal city, which will bagood over any in termediate Connecting road whichit may name tp any other city in the country. It should seem that the law ought to afHx a definite meaning to a practice which has become so general and so uniform, and not leave the rights of the traveling public to the sport of paroi testi- mony. �. But it may be inconvenient for the passenger who has sustained damage through the failure of the last Connecting carrier to perform its part of the understanding, to go back to the place of starting and sue the flrst carrier for. a breach of the contract to carry. Some courts have, therefore, adopted the view that in a contract such as that in the principal case, the carrier selling. the tickets is but the agent of the other Connecting carriers to sell the tickets for them, and aceount to them for the proceeds. Knight v. Portland, etc., R. Co. 56 Me. 235; Furstenhiem v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 9 Heisk. 852; S. C. 1 Cent. Law J. 541; Hood v. New York, etc., R. Co. 2,2> Oonn. 1. But this con- flict of view is of little importance, where the passenger's cause of action is a Personal injury. In such cases, he now sues in tort, especially as he may be able to get exemplary damages in this form of action, which he could not have, if suing in contract. It is pnly in case of the carriage of goods, or in case of the loss of a passenger's baggage, that the question becomes important. In the former case, as pointed out by a recent able writer, the- American courts generally limit the liability pf the carrier, in the absence of special contract, to its own Une. Lawson, Carriers, § 240. In the latter case, the rule is that the loss falls on the particular carrier in whose hands the baggage was lost; that is to say, whatever may be the liability of the carrier selling the ticket, each of the Connecting carriers, whose conductor or other proper agent recog- nizes the ticket and undertakes to carry the passenger in pursuance of it, becomes responsiblefor the, safe carriage of his baggage in case it cornes into his hands. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fahey, 52 111. 81. But the Connecting car- rier would not be respousible wjithout-proof that the baggage did come into his possession. Kessler v. New York, etc., R. Co. 61 N. Y. 538. See Milnor v. New York, etc., R. Co. 53 N. Y. 363. 2. The.faet that the injury to the plaintifE might have been the resuit of ��� �