Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/120

	Essay.	Page
i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an immediate dependence on, and sympathy with, the People,	No. LI.	366
ii. the length of terms of service in other governments,		367
i. British House of Commons, at different periods,		367
ii. Irish Parliament,		368
iii.' the American colonies,		369
iii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dangerous,		370
iv. this conclusion strengthened by other circumstances,		370
i. the Fœderal Congress will possess less power than the British or Irish Parliaments, or the colonial Assemblies,		370
ii. it will be restrained by its dependence on the People, while it will be watched, also, by the several State governments,		370
iii. the other departments of the Fœderal government will possess fewer means to seduce the House than are possessed by the governments referred to,		370
v. objection, that "where annual elections end, tyranny begins," considered,	LII.	371
i. no adequate reason for the opinion,		371
ii. the practice of different States in the choice of their legislators,		371
iii. the practice of the British Parliament, by simple statute, to change fundamental principles of government not applicable, in this case, as a reason,		372
b. are "biennial elections necessary or useful,"		373
i. short terms of office prevent members from acquiring the practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of their duties,		373
i. greater scope of information necessary in the Fœderal than in the State governments,		374
ii. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of foreign affairs,		376
ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who reside at a distance from the capitol,		376
iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the greater number of inexperienced members,		377
iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious elections,		377
v. conclusion, that "biennial elections will be as use-