Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/128

	Essay.	Page
ii. the subjects of its jurisdiction render the trust a delicate one,	No. LXIV.	453
iii. the Senate the most fit depositary of that trust,		454
iv. the propriety of delegating that authority to the Supreme Court considered,		455
i. that court will not possess the fortitude, credit, and authority requisite to the execution of the duties of the trust,		455
ii. the membership of the Supreme Court will be too limited,		456
iii. as the punishment inflicted by the Court of Impeachment will not terminate the proceedings, it will be improper to bring the offender twice before the same court,		456
v. the propriety of a junction of the Supreme Court with the Senate in this trust, considered and denied,		457
vi. the propriety of delegating this authority to those who are wholly disconnected with other departments of the government, considered and denied,		458
vii. the proposed Constitution should not be rejected for that cause, even if this feature is not the most desirable,		459
viii. objections to this portion of the new Constitution considered,	LXV.	460
i. it unites legislative and judicial authority in the same body,		460
A. the inconsistency of those who raise the objection while they admire the constitution of New York, in which similar provisions exist,		461
ii. it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in the Senate, and tends toward the establishment of an aristocracy,		461
iii. as an appointing power, the Senate will be too lenient judges of the conduct of those whom they shall have appointed to office,		463
iv. as a treaty-making power, the Senate may be called to try themselves for corrupt or perfidious action,		465
d. the Executive department,	LXVI.	467
A. the misrepresentations of this subject considered,		467
B. the mode of electing the President considered,	LXVII.	472
a. the only part of the new Constitution which its opponents do not condemn,		472