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Contents.
cxxxi
| Essay. | Page | |
| F. the greater danger is that it will not be used at all times when it may be employed usefully, | No. LXXII. | 513 |
| G. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the legislature may successfully resist it, | 514 | |
| a. a similar power delegated to the "Council of Revision" in New York, | 515 | |
| b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a power similar to that which is here delegated to the Executive, | 515 | |
| c. the latter preferable to the former, | 515 | |
| ii. the command of the military and naval forces of the Union, | LXXIII. | 516 |
| iii. to require opinions of heads of the executive departments, | 516 | |
| iv. the power of pardoning offenders against the laws of the Union, | 517 | |
| A. the propriety of delegating it to a single person considered, | 517 | |
| B. the propriety of delegating authority to the President to pardon traitors considered, | 517 | |
| v. in connection with the Senate, to make treaties, | LXXIV. | 519 |
| A. one of the best digested features of the proposed Constitution, | 519 | |
| B. objection, that it unites the executive and legislative departments, considered, | 520 | |
| a. it is a proper combination of the two departments, | 520 | |
| b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it entirely a legislative subject, but combines the nature of both, | 520 | |
| c. it cannot properly be delegated to an elective Executive alone, | 521 | |
| d. it cannot properly be delegated to the Senate alone, | 522 | |
| e. the House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted to share in that power, | 523 | |
| C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators should be required, instead of two thirds of those present, considered, | 523 | |
| vi. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain public officers, | LXXV. | 525 |
| A. this feature of the proposed Constitution is entitled to particular commendation, | 526 | |
| B. the People at large cannot exercise this power, | 526 |
