tion, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great interests of the Union to the power of the individual States. The Convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Fœderal Government with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FŒDERALIST. No. XXXIII.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg/10px-Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg.png)
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0e/Rule_Segment_-_Flare_Centre_-_14px.svg/14px-Rule_Segment_-_Flare_Centre_-_14px.svg.png)
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg/10px-Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg.png)
To the People of the State of New York:
BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the National Government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of industry, and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States, as among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the Fœderal power