its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed Government cannot be deemed a National one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the General, rather than under the local Governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly National, nor wholly Fœderal. Were it wholly National, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every National society, to alter or abolish its established Government. Were it wholly Fœderal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the Plan of the Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the National, and advances towards the Fœderal character: in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole
