authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the Legislature.
In citing these cases in which the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State Governments. I am fully aware, that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious, that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free Government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. XLVII.
To the People of the State of New York:
IT was shown in the last paper, that the political apophthegm there examined does not require that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should
