tives and magistrates appointed in other States, by very small divisions of the People?
But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted. One branch of the Legislature of Connecticut is so constituted, that each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the Governor of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the President of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode of choosing Representatives of the People tends to elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. LVII.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg/10px-Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg.png)
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0e/Rule_Segment_-_Flare_Centre_-_14px.svg/14px-Rule_Segment_-_Flare_Centre_-_14px.svg.png)
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg/10px-Rule_Segment_-_Span_-_10px.svg.png)
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show, that like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject; or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected, that the Fœderal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State cConstitutions, in the