tion that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the treaties they make will be as advantageous, as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the Article on the subject of impeachments.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. LXIV.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their Judicial character as a Court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments, the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will therefore conclude this head, with a view of the Judicial character of the Senate.
A well-constituted Court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult to be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
