entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post, in which his passion for power and preëminence had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the People, he might induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the People, seconding the thwarted ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the People to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. LXXII.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the Executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident, that without proper attention to this Article, the separation of the Executive from
