Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/183

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THEORY OF KNOWING.
155

PROP. V.————

the premise of that argument (we have nothing to do with the conclusion at present) is false and contradictory. It contradicts Proposition V., which is a necessary and demonstrated truth of reason. It is not possible for any of the qualities of matter to be known per se, or without a "me" or subject being apprehended along with them. Therefore the psychological reasoning in support of the independent existence of matter rests on a foundation which falsifies the necessary laws of knowing; and thus it not only fails to answer the purpose for which it was designed, but it poisons the stream of philosophical truth in its very fountain-head.

The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless, or worse.11. So much, then, for the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, and the uses to which it has been applied. This distinction is one on which psychology usually lays much stress as leading to important consequences. It is, however, a distinction which answers no purpose. It holds out promises which it is unable to fulfil. It affords no refutation even of the spurious idealism which it assails. When viewed in its true colours, it is seen to falsify the laws of knowledge, and to mislead the footsteps of philosophy. It is, at best, a mere bubble on the sea of speculation; and it should now be allowed quietly to break and die. It has played its part as well as it could, and that was not very well.