PROP. IX.————
The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doctrine. of this theory is, that the word "innate" is never to be understood in reference to ideas, but only in reference to a part of every idea, and that neither is the word "foreign, or acquired, or extraneous," ever to be understood in reference to ideas, but only in reference to a part of every idea. There are thus no innate ideas, and no extranate ideas; but every idea or cognition has an element which is innate, and an element which is not so—every cognition, in short, is both innate and extranate—is a synthesis constituted by an a priori part and an a posteriori part. This consideration, of course, fixes these elements (when considered apart from each other), as necessarily unknowable and contradictory.
The misconception to be particularly guarded against. 23. Hence the misconception, above all others to be avoided, if we would form a correct notion—indeed, any notion at all of this theory—is the supposition that some (one class) of our cognitions or ideas are innate; and that others (another class) are originated from without; in other words, the blunder most particularly to be guarded against, is the opinion that the two factors (original and derivative) of our cognitions are themselves cognitions, or can be themselves whole ideas. If this were the theory it would indeed be a portentous, purposeless, and unintelligible chimera.
24. Strange to say, no philosopher that can be
