Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/139

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philosophy of consciousness.
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the alteration. Let us say "external objects take effect upon me, and perception is the result." We now then ask, To what period of our life is this proposition meant to have reference? Does the philosopher of "mind" answer that it may be applied to us during any period, from first to last, of our existence? Then we tell him in return that, in that case, the doctrine is certainly false, for it is not the fact that things take effect upon "me" at the birth or during the earlier years of that particular Being which afterwards becomes "I," there being at that time no "me" at all in the case; no "me" for things to take effect upon, as was proved in the preceding problem, where it was shown that no man is born conscious, or, in other words, that no man is born "I." It is true that things take effect, from the very first, upon that particular Being which, after a time and after a certain process, becomes "I." But this particular Being was not "I" at its birth, or until a considerable time after it had elapsed; and, therefore, the proposition, "things take effect upon me," is seen to be untrue when applied to one period of human life at least, and thus the ego, or that which, in the case of each individual man, is "I;" or, in other words, his true Being is liberated from the control of the law of causality, during the earlier stages at least of his existence, in the most conclusive and effectual way possible, namely, by showing that at that time this "I" has no manner of existence or manifestation whatsoever.