vation; and thus consciousness, the great fact of humanity, together with all its grounds and consequences, has been altogether overlooked in the study of man; while, in consequence of this oversight, his freedom, will, morality, in short, all his peculiar attributes, have invariably crumbled into pieces whenever he has attempted to handle them scientifically.
We trace this erroneous method, this false position, this neglect of the fact of consciousness, entirely to the attempts of our scientific men to establish a complete analogy between psychological and physical research; and, to follow the error to its fountainhead, we boldly trace it up to a latitude of interpretation given to the fundamental canon of the Baconian philosophy: "Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observaverit, nec amplius scit aut potest."
As far as this great rule is held applicable to the study and science of nature, we admit it to be unexceptionable; but when we find it so extended in its application as to include man indiscriminately with nature, we must pause; and although this extension of its meaning should be shown to be in perfect accordance with the whole spirit of Bacon's writings, we must venture, in the name of philosophy, and backed by a more rigorous observation than that which he or any of his followers contend for, to challenge its validity, venerable and authoritative though it be.
