Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/344

holds that visible outness is never suggested by sight at all, or by any "visible ideas or sensations attending vision," and that it is only tangible outness which is so suggested. "Sight" (says Berkeley, Works, vol. i. 147) "doth not suggest or in any way inform us that the visible object we immediately perceive exists at a distance." What Berkeley maintains is, that vision with its accompanying sensations suggests to us another kind of outness and of objects which are invisible, and which always remain invisible, but which may be perceived by touch, provided we go through the process necessary for such a perception. He admits the immediate and unsuggested sensation of visible outness in the sense explained above—that all visible things are directly seen to be external to our visible bodies, only denying (and we think we have assigned good grounds for this denial) that any of them are seen to be external to our own invisible sight. He maintains that this direct sensation of visible outness comes through experience to suggest the perception of a different, namely, of a tangible and invisible, outness. He asserts (we shall here adopt Mr Bailey's language, with some slight variation giving our view of the case), that in consequence of there having been a thousand repetitions of the sensation of visible outness with the sensation of tangible outness, the one will invariably suggest the other. And his theory demands no more than this. He never maintains that because the sensation of visible outness—already explained, we beg the reader to keep