brought us to this conclusion, that to do either of these things effectually we must, in the first place, be philosophers ourselves, or, at any rate, must have a clear and correct idea of what philosophy itself is. This, I say, is a new position, for it raises the new question, But what is philosophy? How shall we go to work in order to obtain a clear conception of it? How shall we set about the acquisition of a philosophical as distinguished from a common consciousness? Here, too, I shall merely offer a few hints, for I think that by this time you ought to have formed for yourselves a pretty distinct conception of what philosophy is in its means and in its ends.
3. To obtain a distinct idea of philosophy let us ask, first of all, What is its converse? If we can get hold of the opposite or counter idea, this will help us to grasp the conception we are in quest of. The converse of philosophy is opinion. You frequently hear the expression "philosophical opinions" made use of. That is altogether a misnomer; strictly speaking, it is a contradiction. There are no opinions in philosophy properly so called. For what are opinions? Opinions are optional thoughts, arbitrary excogitations, thoughts which we may entertain or not, just as we please. We may maintain an opinion, we may also maintain its converse; at least, it is not impossible to maintain the converse of any opinion that may be formed, for that is precisely what is meant by an opinion; it is a thought which we can
