Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/533

and imagination be entirely inoperative, as it often is, it is certain that we have no positive or conscious disbelief in the existence of these objects; and, having no disbelief in their reality, I think we are entitled to say, without stretching the doctrine too far, that we actually believe in their existence, and in their real presence to the mind, though this belief is but momentary, and is constantly broken in upon by the operation of the law of contrast between perception and imagination. You will of course find it impossible to verify the truth of this doctrine by setting yourselves voluntarily to call up imaginary scenes, and then by appealing to your consciousness to ascertain whether you believe in their reality or not. Such an attempt would necessarily defeat itself, because, in endeavouring to banish all contrast between the objects of sense and the objects of imagination, you would of necessity call into play the very law of contrast which you were desirous of suspending. But let me ask you whether, even when you have been sitting in this room, imaginary pictures of your own homes and friends have not sometimes arisen before you? and let me further ask you, whether your minds were then impressed with a distinct disbelief in the reality of these scenes? You will perhaps say that had you been asked whether you believed the scenes to be real, you would at once have answered, No; of course you would, because the spell of your reverie would have been broken, the law of contrast would have come