the reflective labours of his long life may be supposed to be summed up, is a work so wide in its range, so complicated in its details, and so mystical in its tone, that an intelligible analysis of it is a scarcely practicable achievement. It may be more instructive, as well as more practicable, to confine ourselves to a smaller field—to consider, namely, the main point at issue between Schelling and some of the leading philosophers of this country. Perhaps some light will be thrown on his philosophy, its drift and purpose will perhaps become apparent in our attempt, not indeed to settle, but to adjust the terms of this dispute.
It is admitted on all hands, that truth of one kind or another is the proper aim of philosophy. But there are two kinds of truth: truth as it exists in itself, and truth as it exists in relation to us. The first of these is called technically the unconditioned; the latter the conditioned. According to Schelling, unconditioned truth is the proper object of philosophy. According to his opponents (of whom Sir W. Hamilton may be cited as the most distinguished), conditioned truth is the only proper and possible object of philosophy (see Hamilton's Discussions, art. 'The Philosophy of the Unconditioned:' also page 643). Such is the precise and primary point at issue between the two philosophers.
We have now to state and examine the grounds on which each belligerent respectively supports his opinion. Hamilton's opinion is grounded on the as-
