Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/289

thing more" is has been a subject of interminable inquiry and discussion among philosophers. Whatever this "something more" may be explained to be, one important point is gained in our being made conscious of the fact, that in thought there always is and must be something more than the particular thing which obtrusively occupies the mind. The fact is the main thing; how it is to be explained, and what terms are to be used in the explanation, this is of less consequence. 10th, The terms employed to express and to explain this "something more" are the words class, genus, general conception, universal, idea. 11th, These terms, according as they are understood, denote a right theory of thought or a wrong one. If these words be understood to mean that thought begins absolutely with classes, genus, general conceptions, or universals, in other words, that thought begins absolutely with "something more" than the particular thing before us, they express a right theory of thought. If, on the other hand, these words be understood to mean that thought begins with singulars, and passes on to the fabrication of classes, genus, general conceptions, or universals, in that case they imply a wrong theory of thought; and although it is useful to know how logic explains the origin of these classes or genera, or general conceptions, and although we may admit that there is some ingenuity, and even some degree of truth, in the explanation, and that there may be cases in which conceptions are formed by abstraction and