what he calls the ἐντελέχεια, or perfected organisation of the body. There is a scale or series of these organisations in nature, rising one above another; and of these the higher forms always contain the lower. Thus, there is, first and lowest, a plant soul, or life in vegetables. This is a mere principle of nutrition and reproduction, τὸ θρεπτικόν. Plants are able to assimilate what is necessary to support them, and to continue their like. Then, secondly, there is an animal soul, a principle of animal life, which consists in sensation, desire, and locomotion, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, τὸ κινητικόν (κατά τόπον). The functions of this principle are directed and checked by a moderating power (ἀρχή), which is altogether wanting in plants. The higher animals have some degree of fancy (φαντασία) and involuntary memory (μνήμη). Then, thirdly, there is the soul of man, which comprehends, in addition to all these principles, the power of reason (νοῦς). This reason is partly passive, determined, and temporal or transitory; partly active, determining, and immortal. So that the soul of man comprises, according to Aristotle, a power of nutrition and reproduction, a power of sensation, desire, and locomotion, a power of imagination and memory, a power of reason, and, in so far as reason is active and determining, a power of free will.
11. The ethics of Aristotle commence with the remark that the actions of all rational creatures aim at some end. Ends are of two kinds, subordinate
