lastly, he seeks to conform himself to that sovereign will, of which the whole constitution of the universe is only the manifestation, and to fulfil and be in consonance with which must therefore be the highest virtue. Such is the threefold idea of that temper of mind which constituted virtue, and to which the Stoics conceived that it was possible for man not perhaps to attain, but certainly to approximate. And they argued that if this resigned and fortified disposition of the soul were attained, it could not be destroyed nor impaired, nor could its happiness be taken away by anything external to itself. No misfortunes could shake the soul of their ideal sage, no perturbations of passion could overthrow his reason. Hence their doctrine that pain was no evil, and that all calamities were indifferent. Their ideal wise man carried his own happiness with him in the subjugation of his passions, in his ceaseless endeavours to promote the welfare of others, in his perfect acquiescence in whatever fortune might have in store for him, and in his thorough conviction that all things, in the long-run, worked together for good.
8. The main and central idea of the moral philosophy of the Stoics may be presented in this way. The universe, they may be supposed to say—indeed this is the very essence of their teaching—the universe is a vast machine pervaded by an almighty reason, which directs all its ongoings. This great spirit of reason permeates all things, giving law and
