I have described, the history of philosophy must be the history of that pursuit, and accordingly we define the history of philosophy as the history of the pursuit of absolute truth, or of truth as it exists for all intelligence; and the history, moreover, of this pursuit, as conducted under the direction of the universal faculty in man, that is, under the direction of necessary thinking, or, more shortly, of reason.
33. These preliminaries being understood, the historian of philosophy ought now to have a tolerably distinct conception of the work which he has to take in hand. The task which he has to undertake is now apparent, although it may be beyond his power to execute that task even moderately well. It is obvious that the great business of the historian of philosophy must be to note and to point out how, and to what extent, philosophy, as manifested in its history, corresponds with philosophy as laid down in its definition. It is obvious that if philosophy, as manifested in its history, does not correspond at all—indeed, unless it corresponds to a very large extent—with philosophy as laid down in its definition, the definition must be false. It is incumbent, therefore, on the historian of philosophy to show this correspondence. This is the principal work he has to perform. He must be able to show that the spirit of speculative inquiry when looked at in itself, is borne out by the spirit of speculative inquiry when looked at in its historical progress.
