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the senses are not necessarily truths for all minds, but only truths for beings with senses like ours—are, in fact, only truths for some intelligences; and let him be further told, that the truth which philosophy aims at is the truth as it is for all intelligences; and he will be no longer surprised at the disparaging tone in which sensible truth is spoken of in the history of philosophy. He may be of opinion that philosophy is wrong in this, inasmuch as he may think that all truth for man resolves itself into mere sensible truth. But whether philosophy be right or wrong, the student now understands distinctly the ground on which philosophy proceeds in holding as of little or no account the knowledge which comes to man through the senses. He sees that the reason why philosophy undervalues sensible knowledge is, that such knowledge is the truth only for some, but not for all intelligence. And he sees, further, that philosophy, if she is to be true to the terms of her own definition, not only may, but must, affix a brand on all sensible knowledge, stamping it as comparatively invalid and irrelevant.