countries, well supplied with water, and under every disadvantage of arrangement in the supply, in the distribution, and the food of the cattle, and draw a comparison between such difficulties and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But that is not the worst that is to be apprehended; the cattle will of course land in a weak condition, in a desert, and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve or at least be in such a state before they commence their march as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the desert.
"This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve if they do not return immediately, and upon the inutility of the measure if they do.
"It may be imagined that (supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering) if an attempt is not made to cross the desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength (not of our weakness) will induce them to come forward, and it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it and to join the French.
"But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this, their history from
