and devoted all his efforts to repair the damages his ships had sustained in the action.
Yet, whilst actively engaged in this prosaic work, his brain, never idle, had conceived one of the most daring projects which ever entered into the head of a naval commander. Long had he noticed with envy the possession by the English of the only harbour on the eastern coast of Ceylon, capable of containing a large fleet, at the same time that it was strong enough to defy any hostile attack. He lay before Kadalúr in an open roadstead, liable to the storms of the ocean and the attacks of a superior force of the enemy. In this open roadstead he had to carry out all his repairs. The English admiral, he knew well, was about to be joined by the Sceptre of 64 guns and the San Carlos of 44. Were he to be attacked by the force thus increased to a very decided superiority, how could he effectually resist? Considerations of this nature pointed to the advisability of securing a harbour at once large, commodious, and safe. These advantages were possessed by Trincomali. Suffren then resolved to capture Trincomali.
It was a bold, almost an audacious venture. After the combat of the 6th July the English admiral had kept the sea for nearly a fortnight to the windward of Negapatam.[1] With his ships much battered and
- ↑ The only English writer who attempts to justify the English admiral's delay before Negapatam, the author of Transactions in India, says that the situation of the army may have rendered this inaction necessary. But there are no grounds for this supposition. The English army was then likewise in a state of complete inaction.
