was there nothing desirable in the interim or immediate provisions? Did you not think that, irrespective of the plan for the future, there might be some value in the immediate arrangements which would give your people experience in government and earn you the right to demand freedom after the war?”
“Roughly,” Gandhi replied, “this was the spirit in which I approached it. But when I saw the text of the Cripps offer, I was certain that there was no room for cooperation. The main issue was defense. In war time, defense is the chief task of government. I have no desire to interfere with the actual conduct of the war. I am incompetent to do so. But Roosevelt has no special training in strategy, or if he has it is partial.” He hesitated a moment. “Or, let me take Churchill.”
“No,” I said, “you needn’t hesitate to take Roosevelt as an example. I understand the point.”
“The point is,” Gandhi asserted, “that in war time there must be civilian control of the military, even though the civilians are not as well trained in strategy as the military. If the British in Burma wish to destroy the golden pagoda because it is a beacon to Japanese airplanes, then I say you can not destroy it, because when you destroy it you destroy something in the Burmese soul. When the British come and say, we must remove these peasants to build an airdrome here, and the peasants
