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ing among that extremely primitive people. Again, it would be ditticult to maintain the existence of such a separation amongst the Melanesian peoples of whom we have very copious records. This may be due to a gap in our information, but, anyhow, it is not admissible to base a system upon a mere assumption, instead of on certain knowledge.
One does not feel quite easy, also, about the assumption of totemisni being the elementary form of religion (liv. I, cap. iv.), especially as here again we find the investigation limited to the beliefs of the Central Australians.
Prof. Durkheim's theory of totemism is that the essence of totemism lies in the totemic symbol and badge, and that the sacredness of the totem is derived from the sacredness of the badge. A reconsideration, from this new point of view, of the problem of totemism, grown slightly wearisome owing to ^'totemic hyper-production" in recent times, cannot fail to be stimulating. M. Durkheim and his school accept, as is well- known. Dr. Marett's theory of preanimism. The totemic principle, the totemic force, is for Prof. Durkheim akin in nature to mana. This principle, inherent in the first place in the totemic badge and symbol, then in the species, and then in the clansmen, is thus explained: — " Le dieu du clan, le principe totemique, ne peut ■done etre autre chose que le clan lui-meme, mais hypostasie et represente aux imaginations sous les especes sensibles du vegetal ou de I'animal qui sert de totem " (p. 295). Undoubtedly this is a very interesting conception of religion, foreshadowed in our author's former works, in which so much stress is laid on the social nature of the religious, — but here plainly expressed for the first time.
M. Durkheim proceeds to show how it comes about that society is the real substance, the materia prima, of the human conception of divinity. " Une societe a tout ce qu'il faut pour eveiller dans les esprits, par la seule action qu'elle exerce sur eux, la sensation du divin; car elle est a ses membres ce qu'un dieu est a ses fideles" {Ibid.). Again, "parce qu'elle a une nature qui lui est propre, differente de notre nature d'individu, elle poursuit des fins qui lui sont egalement speciales ; mais, comme elle ne peut les atteindre que par notre intermediaire, elle reclame imperieuse- ment notre concours" {Ibid.). Let us note that here society is
