result of incoming experience, acquired in the course of the mental life, and so themselves call for explanation by reference to environment. And secondly, nobody can plausibly maintain that all the needs which human beings are capable of experiencing, or all the "directed tendencies" which they can display, really consist of elements present at the very beginning of the waking life of the individual. In so far as "wish" means merely "directed tendency," the principle of wish fulfilment has extremely little explanatory value, for everything that any man ever says, or does, or thinks, or feels is the manifestation of a "directed tendency." What we really require to know is as to the character of the wish: why this, and not that particular set of images, words and thoughts are present, and why this direction, rather than that, is taken by the outworking of the wish.
These considerations should lead us at once to inspect the doctrine of symbolism. For the theory of symbols is clearly an attempt to find an answer to the first at least of the two pressing problems just mentioned. The fantastic clothing of the popular tale is explained on the ground that it symbolises facts or occurrences connected in general experience with former satisfactions of the "directed tendency" which the story expresses. It is notable, however, that Ricklin, at any rate, makes no attempt at any derivation of "directed tendencies" themselves, as if he were entirely unaware that any problem of this kind is presented.
The first important point concerns the relation of a symbol to its history. As I have mentioned, Ricklin expressly disclaims the need for a study, for psychological purposes, of the "historical pedigree" of the popular tale. But at the same time he urges that the symbol, in a sense, carries its history with it. By the understanding of this alone can the sign be interpreted. Supposing, for the moment, we accept this view without criticism, and turn our attention to the so-called "universal" symbol. How
