President: I think politically 1975 would be better.
Kissinger: The sooner the better for the PRC.
President: I am concerned about Vietnam and the other amendments on Turkey. I am willing to meet with the leaders and also Brademas. I think if I sat down with them and laid out the problem and said, "You can screw it up and end up with a mess."
Kissinger: Karamanlis knows we didn't do anything [to harm him]. But he can't have Papandreou push him to the right. He says he's getting out of NATO which means little. He's got to show that the Papandreou policy would get nothing. I think the time is ripe to meet with the Greeks, maybe by the end of next week.
President: Let's do it with the Greek Congressmen first. Let's keep in mind for the 12th, 13th, or 14th.
Kissinger: On the NSC meeting, I propose five minutes telling you what the proposals are, then a 15-minute CIA briefing, then I go through 15 minutes of political framework, then a general discussion. I suggest you make no decision at the meeting.
The Rabin visit will be the toughest you have had. I want to go over it tomorrow at our meeting.
At the meeting we should not go into too much detail because of the risk of leaks to Israel.
Do you want Rockefeller there? It is risky, but has merit in showing him his responsibilities.
President: I think he should be there. He is perceptive and we show confidence that he will be confirmed.
At the NSC the basic discussion will be the Israeli "Urgent List" and their 10-year plan. It's $40 billion for 10 years. Just the O&M is $4 billion a year for the whole thing, and that is over half their GNP. It will not be a contentious meeting; there is no bureaucratic defense or study. The issue will be to give Rabin something without taking away their incentive to cooperate in the negotiation.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
