Page:Ford, Kissinger - August 26, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552766).pdf/3

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.

Kissinger: Yes. It is their existence at stake.

President: Redacted text - redacted text

Kissinger: Redacted text

On the Greeks. Karamanlis says he is in an impossible situation -- he is the U.S.'s best friend in Greece. That is true, but, he is not yet ready to accept help.

President: His terms are too high.

Kissinger: Yes. The Greeks and Clerides have accepted the Soviet proposal in principle. Everyone is sort of playing their own game now. We could even trigger the Soviets to make a specific proposal. There is no solution which wouldn't infuriate someone.

President: What do you recommend?

Kissinger: I think we should. The British want to make another move. They want to send someone here tomorrow. They want to get a mediation going. If you agree, I will communicate to ask him to get the EC involved. It is too early for us to get involved. We either get egg on our face or we end up beating on the Turks. The more who float the biregional deal, the better off we are eventually. It is better if we don't get stuck with the negotiation. The British will probably fail. If they do, I could offer to meet Karamanlis here or in Europe -- not to settle, but to trigger a negotiation, hopefully one we wouldn't have to run.

President: What is this 28%?

Kissinger: Sorry we are not in tighter control. They have 40%, now they have given up 12%. It is a big concession, but he shouldn't offer any concession.

President: Depending on where the 12% is.

Kissinger: I have asked him to show flexibility. Maybe I'll take a one, or two-day trip next week to meet with Karamanlis and Ecevit. If the British idea works, great, but it almost certainly will fail.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS