Page:Ford, Kissinger - August 28, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552768).pdf/10

This page has been validated.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2

It is a cheap maneuver. We, at some point, have to get involved. But to commit our pressure to a junior minister for goals we don't even have a feel for, and without any idea what was negotiated with Greece and Turkey.

My recommendation is: The Greeks are calming down. When Karamanlis replies, we might think of sending an answer with a responsible guy like Bunker. We should want to see the character of his reply.

The President: The British effort would undercut anything further by us.

Kissinger: They had three good points, but the Greeks wouldn't buy, and maybe the Turks wouldn't, and then we have shot that bullet. Without the British elections, we might get the British out in front, but with the elections, Wilson would use it at our cost. John Freeman said to me: Don't trust Callaghan during an election.

The President: If I am asked what we are doing....

Kissinger: We are in constant touch. We are supporting the British efforts. We are willing to step up our efforts.

The President: If they ask about the Soviet effort....

Kissinger: I would say it is still being discussed.

The President: Can't we rely on current diplomatic efforts plus the Security Council?

Kissinger: I would say the Geneva forum is best, but any forum of two parties would be acceptable. Say something nice about the Greeks -- any settlement should respect Greek honor and dignity.

Let me spend five minutes on CSCE.

The original proposal by the Soviet Union in the early 1960's excluded the United States. Its purpose was to present a substitute for a peace treaty and to create the mood that NATO was no longer necessary. We originally opposed it but gradually changed because all the European leaders pleaded for it and Brandt cut the ground out from under us by
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS