cidental remarks and some of his theories compel us to recognize in him one of the broadest and most penetrating of recent Italian thinkers.
On the other hand, in view of the fact that people pay heed to what I write, I cannot deny that I am myself an intelligent man. And if I cannot go so far as to say as much of myself as I have said of Croce, the fact remains that Croce, both in public and in private, has expressed opinions of my work which do me much honor, and that in the Leonardo some time ago he referred to me as "a keen mind, quick to perceive the essential point of a problem."
How then can you explain the fact that when I read and reread Croce's book on the persistent and the transitory elements in the philosophy of Hegel, I constantly come across phrases the significance of which appears to be perfectly and immediately clear to Croce, while I on the contrary receive from them merely the impression of more or less elegant and symmetrical combinations of words which might have a certain sense if they were taken singly, but lose that sense completely when they are put together in just this way?
I am well aware of the answer that Hegelians give to those who criticize their books on this score: to understand Hegel, they say, you must read him and then reread him and then meditate on him and then consider him in relation with
