Opinion of the Court
could lead to narrowing their reach in other contexts. But we see nothing borderline about this case, where the relevant conduct (as found by the Commission) consists of disseminating false or misleading information to prospective investors with the intent to defraud. And while one can readily imagine other actors tangentially involved in dissemination—say, a mailroom clerk—for whom liability would typically be inappropriate, the petitioner in this case sent false statements directly to investors, invited them to follow up with questions, and did so in his capacity as vice president of an investment banking company.
C
Lorenzo argues that, despite the natural meaning of these provisions, they should not reach his conduct. This is so, he says, because the only way to be liable for false statements is through those provisions that refer specifically to false statements. Other provisions, he says, concern “scheme liability claims” and are violated only when conduct other than misstatements is involved. Brief for Petitioner 4–6, 28–30. Thus, only those who “make” untrue statements under subsection (b) can violate Rule 10b–5 in connection with statements. (Similarly, §17(a)(2) would be the sole route for finding liability for statements under §17(a).) Holding to the contrary, he and the dissent insist, would render subsection (b) of Rule 10b–5 “superfluous.” See post, at 6–7 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
The premise of this argument is that each of these provisions should be read as governing different, mutually exclusive, spheres of conduct. But this Court and the Commission have long recognized considerable overlap among the subsections of the Rule and related provisions of the securities laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 383 (1983) (“[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that” different portions of the securities laws “prohibit some of the same conduct” (internal quotation
