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the President's message, at this session, in the Senate, said: "The opinion once entertained, certainly in my own State, by able and distinguished men and patriots, that the condition of African slavery was one more to be deplored than to be fostered, has undergone a change, and that the uniform—I might almost say universal—sentiment in my own State upon the subject of African bondage, is that it is a blessing to both races, one to be encouraged, cherished, and fostered; and to that extent, the opinion of Virginia is different from the opinion entertained by those distinguished men who have gone; but who, we believe—best knowing their sentiments—if they lived at this day, would concur with us. That is the present opinion." In impressive contrast with this sentiment, which, Senator Mason says, is "the present opinion" of Virginia statesmen, I refer to the opinion of one of her earlier but not less distinguished statesmen, George Mason, the grandfather of the present Senator, and a member of the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States: "Slavery discourages arts and manufactures. The poor despise labor when performed by slaves. They prevent the immigration of whites, who really enrich and strengthen a country. They produce the most pernicious effects on manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of Heaven on a country." Senator Hunter, of Virginia, in the same debate, admitted the same fact as to the state of public opinion in the earlier days of the Republic, and that public opinion in the South had undergone a change. Honorable Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, one of the ablest men of the South, in a speech delivered to his constituents after his return from the last Congress, admitted the same fact. The Republican party, then, has the opinion of the fathers of the Republic on its side, that slavery is an evil "more to be deplored than to be fostered;" but the gentleman from Alabama says, "these were but mere speculations, and were not engrafted upon the organic laws; and actual results are a safer standard by which to measure abstract principles." The Congress of the Confederation gave practical effect to its sentiment of hostility to slavery, by prohibiting it in all the territory the Congress then had jurisdiction over, by the ordinance of 1787. The first session of the First Congress, in order that the provisions of the ordinance might continue, and have full effect, adopted it, and enacted certain provisions to adapt it to the Constitution of the United States. These "were actual results engrafted upon" the legislation of the country. The fathers of the Republic, before and after the adoption of the Constitution, by opinion and action, treated slavery as contraband wherever they could, without violation of existing relations and arrangements. At the second session of the First Congress, an act was passed for the government

of the territory of the United States south of the Ohio river. This act was passed May 26, 1790, and extended over this territory the ordinance of 1787, "except so far as is otherwise provided in the conditions expressed in an act of Congress" of that session, "accepting a cession of the claims of the State of North Caroolina to that territory." The conditions of that act, so far as the same related to slaves, were as follows: "Provided, always, That no regulations made, or to be made, by Congress, shall tend to emancipate slaves." I refer to these acts for two purposes: first, to show that Congress, in extending over this Southern territory the ordinance of 1787, except the anti-slavery proviso, would probably have extended the entire ordinance, had it not been for the proviso in the act of cession of North Carolina; and, second, to show that the Legislature of North Carolina supposed Congress had the power, under the Constitution, to prohibit slavery in the Territory. This act of cession was passed in December, 1790. The first session of the First Congress commenced March 4, 1789; so that the Constitution was in full force when this act of cession was passed; and the State of North Carolina had but recently ratified it, and her statesmen who composed her Legislature in 1790 were presumed to know something about the provisions of the Constitution; and if they had not supposed that Congress possessed the power to abolish slavery in a Territory, they would not have inserted this proviso. Following up the abstractions of the fathers, that slavery was an evil, "more to be deplored than to be fostered," and to show, by "actual results," that they intended to prohibit and restrict it wherever they legally could, I refer to the act of March 22, 1794. The object of this law was, "to prohibit any citizen or resident of the United States from equipping vessels, within the United States, carrying on trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country." (1 Wash. C. C. R., 522.) The next act to the same purport was passed May 10, 1800. This act extends the prohibitions of the act of 1794 to citizens of the United States in any manner concerned in this kind of traffic, either by personal service on board of American or foreign vessels, wherever equipped, or to the owners of such vessels, citizens of the United States. Next in the order of time was the act of February 28, 1803. The object of this act was to prohibit lie importation of negroes, mulattoes, or other persons of color, into any State which by law had prohibited or should prohibit the admission or importation of such persons of color. Tie object of Congress seemed to be to aid the States in getting rid of the evil of slavery. The next action of Congress bearing upon the subject was the act providing for the temporary government of the Louisiana Territory, ceded by France to the United States, passed March 26, 1804. I invite special examination of the tenth section of this act. The first clause