STRATAGEMS, II. i. 11-15
since his opponents were so inflamed with wrath and desperation.^
Gnaeus Ponipey, desiring to check the flight of Mithridates and force him to battle, chose niglit as the time for the encounter, arranging to block his march as he withdrew. Having made his prepara- tions accordingly, he suddenly forced his enemy to fight. In addition to this, he so drew up his force that the moonlight falling in the faces of the Pontic soldiers blinded their eyes, while it gave his own troo{)S a distinct and clear view of the enemy.^
It is well known that Jugurtha, aware of the courage of the Romans, was always wont to engage in battle as the day was drawing to a close, so that, in case his men were routed, they might have the advantage of night for getting away.^
At Tigranocerta in (ireater Armenia, Lucullus, in the campaign against Mithridates and Tigranes, did not have above 15,000 armed men, while the enemy had an innumerable host, which for this very reason was unwieldy. Taking advantage, accordingly, of this handicap of the foe, Lucullus attacked their line before it Avas in order, and straightway routed it so completely that even the kings themselves discarded their trappings and fled.*
In the campaign against the Pannonians, when the barbarians in warlike mood had formed for battle at the very break of day, Tiberius Nero held back his own troops, and allowed the enemy to be hampered by the fog and be drenched with the showers, which happened to be frequent that day. Then, when he noticed that they were weary with standing, and faint not only from exposure but also from exhaustion, he gave the signal, attacked and defeated them.^
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