STRATAGEMS, II. v. 18-20
Memnon, the Rliodian, being superior in cavalry, and wishing to draw down to the plains an enemy who clung to the hills, sent certiiin of his soldiers under the guise of deserters to the camp of the enemy, to say that the army of Meninon was inspired with such a serious spirit of mutiny that some portion of it was constantly deserting. To lend credit to this assertion, Meninon ordered small redoubts to be fortified here and there in view of the enemy, as though the disaffected were about to retire to these. Inveigled by these re})resentations, those who had been keeping themselves on the hills came down to level ground, and, as they attacked the redoubts, were surrounded by the cavalry. ^
When Harrybas, king of the Molossians, was attacked in war by Bardylis, the lUyrian, who com- manded a considerably larger ai*my, he dispatched the non-combatant portion of his subjects to the neighbouring district of Aetolia, and spread the report that he was yielding up his towns and possessions to the Aetolians. He himself, with those who could bear arms, placed ambuscades here and there on the mountains and in other inaccessible places. The Illyrians, fearful lest the possessions of the Molossians should be seized by the Aetolians, began to race along in disorder, in their eagerness for plunder. As soon as they became scattered, Harrybas, emerging from his concealment and taking them unawares, routed them and put them to Hight,
Titus Labienus, lieutenant of Gaius Caesar, eager to engage in battle with the Gauls before the arrival of the Germans, who, he knew, were coming to their aid, pretended discouragement, and, pitching his
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