STRATAGEMS, 11. x. i-xi. 2
the Romans, and arguing according to this calculation tliat they had been beaten, came to terms with the Roman commander.^
Titus Marcius, a Roman knight, who had charge of the remnants of the army [of the Scipios] in Spain, seeing near at hand two camps of the Carthaginians a few miles distant from each othex*, urged on his men and attacked the nearer camp at dead of night. Since the enemy, being flushed with victory, were without organization, Marcius bv his attack did not leave even so much as a single man to I'eport the disaster. Granting his troops merely the briefest time for rest, and outstripping the news of his exploit, he attacked the second camp the same night. Thus, by a double success, he destroyed the Carthaginians in both places and restoi*ed to the Roman people the lost provinces of Spain. ^
XI. On Ensuring the Loyalty of Those Whom One Mistrusts
When Publius Valerius had an insufficient garrison at Epidaurus and therefore feared perfidy on the part of the townspeople, he prepared to celebrate athletic contests at some distance from the city. When nearly all the population had gone there to see the show, he closed the gates and refused to admit the Epidaurians until he had taken hostages from their chief men.
Gnaeus Pompey, suspecting the Chaucensians and fearing that they would not admit a garrison, asked that they would meanwhile permit his invalid soldiers to recover among them. Then, sending his strongest men in the guise of invalids, he seized the city and held it.
189
