Page:Frontinus - The stratagems, and, the aqueducts of Rome (Bennet et al 1925).djvu/63

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Stratagems, I. i. 10-ii. 1

a considerable delay. But after he realized that his subterfuge was suspected, he declared that the rumour which had come to the Spartans was false, and asked them to send some of their leading men, whose word they would take about the building operations of the Athenians. Then he wrote secretly to the Athenians, telling them to detain those who had come to them, until, upon the restoration of the walls, he could admit to the Spartans that Athens was fortified, and could inform them that their leaders could not return until he himself had been sent back. These terms the Spartans readily fulfilled, that they might not atone for the death of one by that of many.[1]

Lucius Furius, having led his army into an unfavourable position, determined to conceal his anxiety, lest the others take alarm. By gradually changing his course, as though planning to attack the enemy after a wider circuit, he finally reversed his line of march, and led his army safely back, without its knowing what was going on.

When Metellus Pius was in Spain and was asked what he was going to do the next day, he replied: "If my tunic could tell, I would burn it."[2]

When Marcus Licinius Crassus was asked at what time he was going to break camp, he replied: "Are you afraid you'll not hear the trumpet?"[3]

II.—On Finding Out the Enemy's Plans

Scipio Africanus, seizing the opportunity of sending an embassy to Syphax, commanded especially chosen tribunes and centurions to go with Laelius,

  1. 478 B.C. Cf. Thuc. i. 90 ff.
  2. 79–72 B.C. Cf. Val. Max. vii. iv. 5.
  3. Plut. Demetr. 28 tells the same story of Antigonus and Demetrius.
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