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FRYBARGER v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP.
Cite as 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987)
525

Analysis

The omissions as to Peeraer were clearly immaterial. There was no confusion between Peeraer and Kinstler and the fact that Peeraer had been in prison since 1983 had no relevance to the warrant. Tellis made it clear that Peeraer was in jail as a result of the 1983 search of the Park Drive house. He did not have to say that anyone had been arrested as a result of the 1983 search of Graham Hill Road—the non-success of that search was implicit in the affidavit. The mistakes as to the vehicles were the result of some confusion in the transmission of information, and the confusion did not subtract from the substance of the affidavit. In the totality of facts meticulously set out by Tellis, the minor mistakes were inconsequential. There is no evidence that they were the result of deliberate or reckless falsehood. There is no basis under Franks, supra for reversing the district court.

What the affidavit did present amply and accurately was information that two of the principal ingredients in the manufacture of methamphetamine had been purchased and brought to the Lincoln Road property, a remote location. Other materials brought there or in use there—the plastic containers, the duct and the brown barrel—were also indicia of a methamphetamine laboratory operation. The material taken to the dump was consistent with such an operation. The evasive maneuvers of the truck going to the dump and the evasive maneuvers of the Dodge Ramcharger on May 31 suggested criminal conduct that had to be hidden. The information the narcotics agents possessed about past activities of Kinstler, Lynda Treadway and David Lyle constituted additional circumstances to be taken into account in assessing the significance of the activity observed at Lincoln Road.

Entirely apart from the minor omissions and misstatements, Tellis’ affidavit furnished a basis for the issuer of the warrant “to make a practical common sense decision” that there was “a fair probability” that evidence of a crime would be found at the locations for which the warrants were sought. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Not only does the appellant fail to prove his case under Franks, but the totality of the circumstances set out by Tellis constituted probable cause for the warrant to issue.

No single detail among those set out in the affidavit was itself conclusive. Rather, the details converged to form a pattern. As is normally the case when a human mind is making a judgment of probability, it is the convergence and the pattern that are determinative. Convergence and pattern reduce the likelihood of accident or coincidence. When there is enough convergence and pattern, as happened here, there is a fair probability that further information produced by a warrant will confirm the inferences already formed.

AFFIRMED.

Anthony James FRYBARGER, Plaintiff-Appellent,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Gebelli Software, Inc., and Nasir Gebelli, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86–2004.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 14, 1987.

Decided March 10, 1987.