Hence, if both the continental policies which commended themselves to nineteenth-century statesmen are obsolete, whither shall we steer in Europe, since steer we must?
The two policies above mentioned, though apparently divergent, were fundamentally rooted alike in the same hypothesis. That hypothesis was one of pessimism as regards the European world. For the advocates of the first policy assumed that Europe was such a whirlpool that it was best to avoid it altogether; while the advocates of the second equally assumed the continent to be so incapable of managing its own affairs properly that England was bound to intervene occasionally for freedom's sake.
Our present point of view must be somewhat different. We start from the assumption that, in our day, we cannot avoid constant association with Europe. Accordingly, the precise issue now before us is whether we shall restrict that association as far as possible, or whether we shall extend and regularise it, on a settled plan.
At the European ball, shall we dance every turn, or shall we merely be agreeable to the dowagers? That depends on Europe.
If any Briton, now or at any time, were to ask for a forecast of European affairs, he would hear, no doubt, that things are at their gravest, that they were never more threatening, and that war, if not actually declared, would break out somewhere and soon. Yet our dismayed islander might take
